We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our primary empirical proxy for disclosure and document the following. First, we predict and find higher sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance (both accounting and stock returns) for firms that issue management guidance than for firms that do not. Second, in a sub-sample of firms that issue management guidance, we predict and find that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance is increasing in the frequency of management guidance events during the year and in the number of consecutive years that firms have issued management guidance (i.e., the payperformance relation is increasing in the "degree" of disclosure). Our results are robust to tests that use conference calls as an alternative disclosure metric, multiple tests that address the potential endogeneity of management's decision to issue guidance (using a Heckman self-selection model, employing a matched-sample approach, and identifying a subsample of firms in which increased disclosure is likely to be exogenous), lead-lag tests, and tests that control for the information environment, the asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to positive and negative performance, and variations in investment opportunities.
loyalty can also align board members with CEOs (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2005) . Agency theories argue that pressures from external investors are necessary to encourage managers to pursue value-maximizing policies (e.g., Jensen 1986; Bushman and Smith 2003) .
Third, increased disclosure can potentially improve the quality of boards' information sets.
While boards will receive private information, the board depends largely on management for its information (The Economist 2001; Adams and Ferreira 2007; Johanson 2007) . This information could be biased or distorted. The CEO has little incentive to provide information that could cause board members to revise downward their assessment of the CEO's talent or abilities. A publiclydisclosed signal will undergo more scrutiny by external stakeholders, and more care will be taken in the process of disseminating it.
The theoretical intuition for our prediction follows that of agency theory. Better information can lead to a better understanding of the relation between the manager's actions and performance, hence reducing noise in the estimated relation. Improved transparency can also allow stakeholders to more easily filter out the noise caused by factors unrelated to management's actions on performance, consistent with the "noise reduction" role of information (see, e.g., Banker and Datar 1989; Lambert 2001) . Furthermore, disclosure can improve the precision of the performance signal. For example, the literature shows that voluntary disclosure by firms results in more informationally-efficient stock prices.
2 Thus, we predict that the payperformance relation will be stronger for firms that provide guidance, our primary empirical proxy for higher disclosure.
The analysis in this study supports our prediction. First, in a regression of CEO compensation (salary plus bonus) on accounting and stock price performance, we document that the coefficients on both performance measures are higher for firms issuing guidance. 3 Our results suggest that this difference is economically meaningful. Second, in a sub-sample of firms that issue management guidance, we further find that the pay-performance relation is stronger in the "degree" of disclosure. Specifically, the sensitivity of compensation to performance is increasing in the frequency of management guidance events during the year and in the number of consecutive years that firms have issued management guidance. Replicating our main tests using conference calls as an alternative measure of disclosure provides corroborating evidence.
Management guidance is a voluntary disclosure and hence it is possible that the decision to disclose is related to the compensation decision. We address the potential endogeneity of managements' decision to issue guidance in three ways. First, we use a Heckman self-selection model, in which the first stage (which is based on prior research) predicts whether guidance was issued and the second stage estimates the pay-performance relation. Second, we use a matchedsample approach. Third, we study a subsample of firms in which the decision to disclose is likely unrelated to compensation (i.e., firms initiating disclosure immediately following the passage of Reg FD). Our results are robust to these tests.
We also investigate alternative explanations for our results. We show that our results hold in settings in which the disclosure decision more clearly precedes the compensation decision. For example, last year's disclosure strengthens this year's pay-performance relation. In contrast, next year's disclosure does not increase this year's pay-performance relation (i.e., we control for "reverse causality"). Our results are also robust to controls for the information environment, the asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to performance, and variations in investment opportunities.
Our study contributes to the literature that examines how agency problems can be mitigated through increased transparency (see Healy and Palepu 2001; Ball 2006) . Several empirical studies relate better disclosure to better firm performance (e.g., Biddle and Hilary 2006; Hope and Thomas 2008) . These papers implicitly assume that disclosure leads to better monitoring, which in turn leads to better performance. By focusing on the pay-performance relation, we establish a more direct link between disclosure and monitoring.
In addition, our study informs the current debate about the role of management guidance.
Critics have called for an end to management guidance. They purport that such disclosures create incentives for firms to manage earnings upwards, distort earnings, or act myopically. Whether managers do so is an open question and the empirical evidence is mixed (e.g., Cheng, Subramanyam, and Zhang 2005; Houston, Lev, and Tucker 2008) . We are agnostic about the costs of management guidance, and we do not suggest an equilibrium amount of management guidance. We simply point out that improved monitoring of CEOs represents a potential benefit that should be considered in analyses of management guidance.
In the next section we develop our hypothesis. In Section 3, we discuss the sample and present our primary tests and results. In Section 4, we provide tests that address the potential endogeneity in our main tests. Section 5 examines conference calls as an alternative measure of disclosure. In Section 6, we consider alternative explanations. Section 7 concludes.
Hypothesis Development

The role of disclosure in board monitoring of managers SHORTEN FURTHER
Boards of directors are responsible for monitoring firm management. Such monitoring is potentially valuable since managers will not always act in the best interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976 ). An important component of this governance responsibility is the board's ultimate oversight of executive compensation matters. 4 The effectiveness of boards in carrying out this monitoring responsibility, however, is widely debated. In fact, a number of studies indicate that the pay-setting process has strayed far from the arm's-length model assumed in most economic models of pay arrangements. 5 In particular, studies find that managerial power leads to compensation schemes that weaken managers' incentives to increase firm value and that could even create incentives for managers to take actions that reduce long-term firm value (see also Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson 2005; Hope and Thomas 2008) . Bebchuk and Fried (2005) show that flawed compensation packages are widespread, persistent, and systematic.
One explanation for imperfect boards is that board members have economic incentives to support, rather than monitor, the CEO. Serving on a board can provide a salary or other compensation as well as valuable business and social connections. Inside board members often directly (or indirectly) report to the CEO. Outside board members are often recruited and nominated by management. Warther (1998) demonstrates that managerial power to remove board members could result in a passive board (see also Hermalin and Weisbach 1998) . The CEO can also influence director compensation or other benefits such as the amount of business dealings the CEO's firm does with the director's firm. For instance, Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) find that higher CEO pay is correlated with higher board pay (including compensation committee member pay), and that this relation reflects insider cooperation rather than firm performance. Further, a variety of social and psychological factors align board members with CEOs, including: collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board, friendship, and loyalty (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Fried 2005) . These incentives for boards to be 4 Directors' responsibilities include establishing and overseeing the executive compensation policy, reviewing performance targets established under the company's incentive programs, and assessing techniques for monitoring and measuring performance (e.g., NYSE 2002; CICA 2003) . 5 Bebchuk and Fried (2003; summarize this view and the supporting literature. A special issue of The Economist ("Power Pay," January 20, 2007) discusses many practical examples.
"friendly" with management will offset the incentives to serve shareholders provided by boards' fiduciary obligations and financial incentives such as boards' stock ownership.
Another explanation for imperfect boards is that the information board members receive could be biased or distorted. The board depends largely on management for its information (The Economist 2001; Adams and Ferreira 2007; Johanson 2007 ). Certainly, boards should have access to private information beyond that provided by public disclosures. The CEO, however, has little incentive to provide information that could cause board members to revise downward their assessment of the CEO's talent or abilities. For instance, boards likely have access to internally-generated budgets. But, managerial accounting scholars commonly observe that budgets are often conservatively biased (i.e., budgets have slack) because employees who provide the information know that it will also be used to evaluate their performance, and hence affect their compensation (e.g., Zimmerman 2006, 272; Hilton 2008, 376) .
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The focus of our study is on the role of disclosure in improving board effectiveness. We provide three rationales for this relation. First, extant research argues in general that financial disclosures are an important means of monitoring managers to make them more accountable (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001; Watts and Zimmerman 1986 ). Healy and Palepu (2001) discuss how disclosures can reduce agency costs by providing principals with an effective monitoring tool. Specifically, better disclosures improve the monitor's ability to relate managerial decisions to firm performance (Lombardo and Pagano 2002; Hope and Thomas 2008) . Similarly, Ball (2006) argues that increased transparency causes managers to act more in the interests of shareholders.
6 A recent Wall Street Journal article (Lublin 2008 ) discusses how some pay panels are "amassing a wider array of objective data," and provides an example of pay panels that asked a consultant to "compare management predictions of future financial performance with investment analysts' outlook for those companies." These boards' actions are consistent with them receiving insufficient information from management to properly execute their monitoring role.
Second, increased disclosure can allow external stakeholders, such as institutional investors, analysts, and the media, to develop their own independent and informed views on firms'
decisions. Board members care about their public reputation, which could be threatened if external stakeholders were to criticize them for poor decisions (Bebchuk and Fried 2005) . In essence, disclosure can help in the "monitoring of the monitors," and hence can be effective in countering the disincentive to monitor associated with boards who are CEO friendly. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the strength of the pay-performance relation, suggesting that institutions monitor CEO compensation structures. A number of empirical studies provide indirect evidence of how firm disclosure can be used by outsiders to monitor the activities of managers, including Bens and Monahan (2004) , Biddle and Hilary (2006) , Frederickson and Hillary (2006) , Khurana, Pereira, and Martin (2006) , Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2008) , and Hope and Thomas (2008) .
Regulators also view disclosure to be critical in bringing shareholders and others more directly into the compensation process. Starting in 1992, the SEC required the compensation committee to disclose its specific rationale for the executive compensation paid, as well as for the relationship of the compensation paid to the company's performance. The SEC believed these disclosures would "bring shareholders into the compensation committee or board meeting room and permit them to see and understand the specific decisions made through the eyes of the directors" (Mobley 2005, 119) . Similarly, beginning with 2007 filings, U.S. corporations must now include a "Compensation Disclosure and Analysis" (CD&A) section. The intent behind the CD&A is to "provide investors access to clear explanations of executive compensation and the philosophy that underlies compensation." (Dalton and Dalton 2008, 85) . 7 Home Depot provides an example of how shareholders pressure the board to effectively monitor and discipline managers. With its stock appreciating at a slower rate than its rivals, dissident shareholders at Home Depot launched Third, increased disclosure has the potential to improve the quality of boards' information set (e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2007) . 8 A publicly-disclosed signal will undergo more scrutiny by external stakeholders, such as regulators, investors, and the media. Firms are more careful in the collecting and handling of this public information, with lawyers, auditors, and investor-relation managers all potentially playing a role in the dissemination process. As a result, publiclydisclosed information could be less biased and more credible than information privately disclosed to the board. 9 Furthermore, information could flow from external stakeholders to board members. For example, board members may update their beliefs about the company's policies after reading media and analysts' reports, or after discussions with institutional investors.
The role of disclosure in setting the pay-performance relation
The theoretical intuition for our hypothesis follows that of agency theory. When it is prohibitively costly or not possible for the principal to fully observe the agent's actions, imperfect information is used to alleviate the moral hazard problem (Holmström 1979) . The standard prediction is that the principal will set pay to be a positive function of observed performance. The intensity of the pay-performance relation is predicted to increase in the strength of, and decrease in the noise in, the relation between the agent's action and the performance signal (e.g., Banker and Datar 1989) . Another explanation for this prediction is that a proxy fight to create an independent committee to evaluate management and study strategic alternatives. At the same time, corporate governance experts called into question the size of the CEO's pay package and analysts began to question his stewardship in the face of a dramatic housing downturn. This eventually led to the CEO's ouster (Financial Times, December 19, 2006; The Economist, January 7, 2007 if the principal can more confidently estimate the agent's unobservable action given the observable performance signal, then the principal will tie pay more strongly to performance.
The mechanism underlying our prediction that disclosure increases the pay-performance relation could work in three general ways as follows. First, theoretical models typically assume that the principal knows the specific function between the agent's action and the firm's performance and that the agent's actions are limited to one dimension (e.g., effort 
Management guidance as important firm-provided disclosures
In this study, we use management guidance as our primary proxy for increased disclosure.
Other studies, such as King, Pownall, and Waymire (1990) , Coller and Yohn (1997) , and Rogers and Van Buskirk (2008) also use guidance as a direct measure of a firm's disclosure policy.
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Management guidance is voluntary, and usually includes, among other things, a forecast about a firm's expected earnings. Research shows that firms issue guidance to align the market's expectations with their own earnings assessments (King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990; Ajinkya and Gift 1984) . In other words, managers use guidance to mitigate information asymmetry between investors and managers as suggested by theory (Coller and Yohn 1997; Marquardt and Wiedman 1998; Dye 2001; Verrecchia 2001) . Guidance also preempts litigation concerns, and potentially influences managers' reputations for transparent and accurate reporting (Skinner 1994 (Skinner , 1997 Hirst et al. 2008; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005) .
In addition to a forecast, management guidance typically includes additional qualitative disclosures. 11 As some specific examples, Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) show that management forecasts are accompanied by other disclosures, such as verifiable forward-looking statements and qualitative discussions, about two thirds of the time. Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2004) find that about three quarters of management forecasts include a discussion and explanation for the forecasted performance. Baginski et al. (2004) show that management forecasts are accompanied by disclosures that link the forecasted performance with both internal management actions (e.g., new products, prices, strategies, and capital investments) and external issues (e.g., input prices, legal actions, and exchange rates). Baginski et al. (2004) argue that these attributions potentially aid investors by confirming known relations between attributions and performance or identifying additional causes of performance. Hence, guidance could improve the pay-performance relation by allowing stakeholders to more easily observe and estimate, as well as filter out the noise in, the relation between the CEO's actions and firm performance. Note that because management guidance often contains more than just earnings forecasts per se, realized earnings will not subsume the information provided by guidance.
Prior research concludes that the credibility of management forecasts compares with that of audited financial information. For example, Pownall and Waymire (1989) find that the market reaction to unexpected management forecasts is similar in magnitude to the reaction to unexpected earnings announcements. Pownall, Wasley, and Waymire (1993) document that management forecasts affect stock prices, and in particular that such forecasts remain informative even after controlling for other disclosure types. 12 Given these strong capital market effects, management guidance could lead to more information impounded in prices, and hence a higher expected pay-performance relation.
Tests and Results
Empirical model
Our empirical model follows that used in the extant compensation literature. In particular, Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Core (2002) suggest the following specification for tests of the pay-performance relation:
Including expected pay controls for a variety of factors that could affect compensation, such as firm size, CEO age, and corporate governance. Using last year's pay as the expectation about this year's pay, and placing it on the left-hand side, leads to:
The coefficient β represents the pay-performance relation and is expected to be positive. From our hypothesis, we expect β to be greater for firms that have higher levels of disclosure (i.e., issue management guidance). To test this notion we estimate separate coefficients for firms that issue and do not issue management guidance by interacting a management guidance indicator variable (Guidance) with Unexpected Performance.
Specifically, we estimate various specifications of the following regression test using the full sample of firms (both firms that issue and do not issue guidance):
Comp is the CEO's cash compensation, measured as the sum of salary and bonus. The symbol ∆ refers to the change in the variable from last year and ln( ) is the natural logarithm of the variable. ROA is net income before extraordinary items scaled by lagged total assets. Ret is the one-year return to shareholders during the fiscal year adjusted for the value-weighted return on a market portfolio from CRSP. 13 Guidance equals one for firms that issue a management earnings forecast, and zero otherwise. We do not distinguish between qualitative or quantitative or between quarterly or annual forecasts. 14 The subscripts i and t denote the firm and fiscal year, respectively. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Equation (4) tests whether the CEO pay-performance relation is increasing in the existence of management disclosure. We next examine whether the pay-performance relation is increasing in the degree of disclosure. Following Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005), our first proxy for the degree of disclosure is the frequency of forecasts issued (i.e., management guidance events) in a given year. All else equal, we expect that more disclosures lead to higher levels of transparency. Our second proxy captures whether firms' "commitment" to disclose matters. For example, following theoretical work by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) emphasize the commitment by a firm to increase disclosure. Indeed, only a fraction of the firms issuing guidance in our sample consistently do so.
example, Rogers (2005) finds that longer-horizon management forecasts are more effective at reducing information asymmetry. Results from these tests are similar to our main tests and all inferences remain unchanged. 15 In untabulated sensitivity analyses, similar results obtain when we include CEO fixed effects to control for differences in CEO characteristics, such as risk tolerance. 16 Studies generally find empirical evidence in support of agency theory predictions when cash compensation is used but not when total compensation (i.e., CEO salary plus bonus plus changes in the CEO's equity portfolio value) is used to measure compensation (see, e.g., Baber, Kang, and Kumar 1998; Core, Guay, and Verrecchia 2003) . 17 However, this view is not necessarily universally shared. For example, Palmon, Bar-Yosef, Chen, and Venezia (2008) discuss how stock option grants can be used to reward effort.
18 Core et al. (2003) provide additional reasons to explain why cash pay supports but total compensation fails to support standard agency model predictions. Hayes and Schaefer (2000, 278) provide support for the focus on salary and bonus with the following arguments: "We are interested in the incentives provided by the board's ability to reward CEOs.…Thus, for our purposes it is appropriate to examine only those instruments over which the board has direct control. Hence, salary plus bonus is probably a more appropriate measure than total CEO pay-related wealth."
This leads one to question to what extent the issuance of guidance can be useful in monitoring managers, when it is somewhat sporadic. While it is not possible for managers to ex ante commit to issuing guidance, we use the number of consecutive years that firms have issued management guidance as a proxy for an implicit commitment to disclose.
To test whether the degree of disclosure matters, we estimate the following two equations within the sample of guidance-issuing firms:
∆ln ( Guide_Frequency is the number of management forecasts issued by the firm during year t.
Guide_Consistency is the number of consecutive years in which the firm has provided a forecast, including the current year.
When estimating equations (4) to (6), following Core, Guay, and Verrecchia (2003), we also include year effects. We also include industry effects (i.e., two-digit SIC codes) to control for cross-industry differences, such as in the CEO's tasks. In addition, because the estimations of these equations are likely to suffer from time-series dependence, we estimate the model as a panel and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests where there is a prediction of the coefficient's sign and based on two-tailed tests otherwise.
Sample
Our sample is based on the intersection of the Compustat Executive Compensation Table 2 reports descriptive statistics about the variables used in our analysis separately for the sub-samples of 5,731 guidance and 3,283 non-guidance firm years. All differences between the guidance and non-guidance groups are statistically significant at the 5% (two-sided) level for 19 Inferences are unaffected if we do not require that the CEO hold the position for the entire year or if we retain firms that change their fiscal year-ends. 20 Like Feng and Koch (2008), we limit the sample to firms on the First Call Analyst database because the First Call Company Issued Guidelines ("CIG") database provides the best coverage of guidance for the firms that are also covered by First Call sell-side analysts. If First Call covers the firm as evidenced by their collection of the firm's analyst forecasts but reports no guidance for the firm, then it is more likely that the firm truly did not issue any guidance. This reduces the potential error associated with mis-classifying firms not included in the CIG database as non disclosers. To the extent that First Call chooses which firms to cover, this potential selection bias will not affect our inferences because all the firms in our sample were selected by First Call for coverage. 21 As an alternative method to control for outliers, in untabulated analysis, we eliminate observations with a Cook's D value greater than 4/n, where n is the number of observations in the sample. Inferences are unchanged.
Descriptive statistics
both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon) tests, with the exceptions of Loss, var(∆ROA), and Leverage. Table 4 provides the results of estimating equation (4). Columns (1) to (3) We find a significantly positive coefficient when Guidance is interacted with each of ∆ROA and Ret. Our main results are reported in column (6) which shows that the respective coefficients are 0.389 and 0.069, both significant at the 1% level. In other words, the pay-performance relation is strengthened in the presence of management guidance, our primary empirical proxy for increased disclosure.
Results
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In terms of economic significance, using the column (6) results, the non-guidance firms have a ∆ROA coefficient of 0.727, while guidance firms have an incremental ∆ROA coefficient of 0.389. This implies that guidance firms' compensation-accounting performance sensitivity is approximately 54% (i.e., 0.389/0.727) higher than for non-guidance firms. A similar calculation 22 While not our main variable of interest, we note that the coefficient on Guidance (not interacted) is negative. The prediction of this coefficient is ambiguous (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003). On one hand, agency theory predicts that higher pay-performance sensitivity is associated with higher expected pay. On the other hand, if CEOs are awarded excessive compensation on average, increased monitoring associated with management guidance should lead to reduced executive pay.
shows that the compensation-return performance sensitivity is approximately 47% higher for guidance firms.
Our tests for whether the degree of disclosure matters are presented in Table 5 . The number of observations is smaller because we restrict this analysis to firms with guidance. Columns (1) to ( Guide_Consistency is interacted with only ∆ROA, the coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
In column (5), the coefficient on the interaction of Guide_Consistency and Ret is significant at the 1% level. However, when both performance measures are interacted with
Guide_Consistency, while the Ret interaction remains significant (at the 1% level), the ∆ROA interaction is no longer significant. These results imply that the pay-performance relation is increasing in management guidance frequency and modestly increasing in the number of consecutive years with guidance. More importantly, these results provide support for the idea that the pay-performance relation is increasing in the degree of disclosure.
Additional Analyses to Address Potential Endogeneity
Because issuing guidance is voluntary, our above tests are subject to endogeneity. In other words, it is possible that the decision to disclose is related to the compensation decision. We address the endogeneity of management's decision to issue guidance in three ways. First, we use a Heckman self-selection model. Second, we use a matched-sample design. Third, we take advantage of the external shock to management guidance generated by the passage of Reg FD to identify a subsample of firms in which increased disclosure is likely to be exogenous to the payperformance relation. We discuss each approach in turn.
Heckman self-selection model
We follow Heckman (1979) 
MV is the firm's equity market value measured at the beginning of the year. CEOTenure is the difference in years between the current year and the year the CEO became CEO according to ExecuComp. We include three variables that proxy for better corporate governance. CompProp is the ratio of CEO stock price-based compensation to total compensation and Wealth is the value ($M) of shares held by the CEO, both following Nagar et al. (2003) . NumMtgs is the number of board meetings during year t, according to ExecuComp.
Note that requiring data to calculate these explanatory variables reduces the size of our sample to 5,873 observations.
In the second stage, we estimate our equation (4) 
Matched sample
We also employ a matched-sample design. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997; provide theoretical support for matching as an econometric technique for addressing endogeneity. For each disclosing firm, we match it with a non-disclosing firm in the same year and in the same Fama and French (1997) industry, and we minimize the distance between the sizes of the disclosing and non-disclosing firms. Thus, we attempt to include firms that have similar incentives to issue guidance. These matching criteria further limit the size of our sample.
The matched sample consists of 1,845 matched firm-year pairs of disclosers and non-disclosers, or 3,690 firm-year observations. Note that each non-disclosing firm-year observation is uniquely matched to one disclosing firm. Table 6 , Panel B, Column (2) presents the results of estimating equation (4) for the matched sample. The coefficients on Guidance interacted with the performance measures are positive and statistically significant, corroborating those of the Table   4 full-sample tests above. The other coefficients of this regression also have signs and magnitudes consistent with the above results.
Increased guidance associated with Reg FD
We identify 84 firms with available data that initiate guidance in the year 2001, the year after the passage of Reg FD in 2000. This change in guidance is likely to be exogenous to the payperformance relation. We re-estimate our equation (4) model for these firms, for the years 2001 and 2000, the years in which they provide and did not provide guidance, respectively. Column (3) of Table 6 , Panel B shows that the coefficients on the interaction of Guidance with the performance measures are both positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level).
As a control, we estimate the same tests (results not tabulated) for a subsample of 109 firms that provide no guidance over the same period and create a pseudo "guidance" variable that equals one if the year is 2001. As expected, there is no evidence of an increase in the payperformance relation for these firms.
In sum, our results are robust to controls for endogeneity using a Heckman self-selection model, a matched-pair design, and a subsample of firms experiencing an exogenous Reg FDassociated increase in disclosure.
Conference Calls as an Alternative Measure of Disclosure
The underlying construct that we want to measure is firms' discretionary disclosure and our primary empirical proxy for disclosure is management guidance. In this section, we replicate our main tests using an alternative disclosure metric: conference calls. Corroborating evidence based on conference calls increases the generalizeability of our guidance-based results. In addition, conference-call evidence mitigates the possibility that our guidance-based measures are capturing some factor other than disclosure, and that this other factor is driving our results.
A number of studies use conference calls to study firms' voluntary disclosure decisions. We re-estimate our main tests for whether the strength of the pay-performance relation is increasing in the occurrence and the degree of disclosure (i.e., equations (4) to (6)) substituting analogous conference-call measures for the guidance-based measures. In addition, like management guidance, conference calls are voluntary and it is possible that the decision to have conference calls is related to the compensation decision. Thus, we also estimate Heckman selfselection tests (i.e., equations (7) and (8)) but predict conference-call instead of managementguidance occurrence. Conference Call equals one for firms that hold a conference call, and zero otherwise.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 7 . Column (1) shows that the coefficient on
Conference Call interacted with ∆ROA is positive and statistically significant, as expected, while the coefficient on Conference Call interacted with Ret is not significant. In column (2) of Table 7 we present the second-stage results when we include the Inverse Mills ratio from the selection model into our tests. The coefficients on Conference Call interacted with both performance measures are positive and statistically significant, as expected. The conference call results thus provide additional corroborating evidence that disclosure strengthens the pay-performance relation.
Alternative Explanations
Recall that our compensation variable is already measured in changes. In effect, each firm uses itself as a benchmark and, hence, implicitly controls for unknown, potentially-correlated firm-specific factors that do not change over time. We discuss each of five alternative explanations in turn.
Timing of disclosure and compensation decisions ("reverse causality")
To strengthen the interpretation of our results that disclosure leads to a stronger pay-performance relation, we investigate whether we obtain our results in settings in which the disclosure decision more clearly precedes the compensation decision. The results of these tests are presented in Table 8 , Panel A.
First, we consider only the bonus part of compensation. If salary is mostly set at the beginning of the year and bonus is determined mainly at the end of the year, then the disclosure decision could affect the bonus-performance relation more so than the salary-performance relation. Column (1) shows the results of estimating equation (4) Overall, these results show that when the disclosure decision leads the compensation decision, we continue to find results that support our main empirical findings. Although these results cannot definitively prove causality, the evidence is certainly consistent with management guidance causing the pay-performance relation to strengthen. 25 In untabulated analysis we include next year's disclosure decision without including the contemporaneous and/or last year's disclosure decision. The coefficient on next year's disclosure is not significant.
Information environment
More information from a wide variety of sources, not necessarily from voluntary firm disclosures, could also lead to higher transparency, and hence a stronger pay-performance relation. We use firm size (e.g., Schaefer 1998), analyst coverage (e.g., Brennan and Subramanyam 1995) , and institutional ownership (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003) as proxies for the information environment. 
The coefficients of firm-size interacted with the performance variables as well as the coefficients of institutional ownership interacted with the performance variables are all positive and statistically significant, consistent with expectations. The coefficient on analyst coverage interacted with ∆ROA is not significant, while the coefficient on analyst coverage interacted with
Ret is negative and statistically significant. 26 The coefficients on Guidance interacted with the two performance variables remain positive and statistically significant. We conclude that our results are not attributable to the information environment as an alternative explanation.
Asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to performance
To test potential asymmetric response to poor and good performance (e.g., Skinner 1994; Gaver and Gaver 1998; Miller 2002; Hope 2003) , we partition our sample in three ways: below and above the median change in ROA; below and above the median returns; and, negative and positive ROA. 
Investment opportunities
The literature has studied the effects of investment opportunities on the pay-performance relation (e.g., Lambert and Larcker 1987; Baber et al. 1996 Core et al. 2003 In addition to the book-to-market ratio, leverage and firm age are also related to firms' investment opportunities (Leone et al. 2006 
Conclusion
We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executive compensation. Consistent with this assertion, we predict and find higher sensitivity of cash 27 In a related idea, Leone et al. (2006) show that cash compensation is more sensitive to negative than to positive stock returns. They argue that their results are consistent with boards exercising discretion to reduce costly ex-post settling up in cash compensation paid to CEOs. To test whether our results are sensitive to this asymmetric sensitivity to bad news, we create an indicator variable that equals one if Ret is negative and zero otherwise. We then estimate (results not tabulated) equation (4) augmented with the indicator variable and an interaction of this indicator variable with both performance measures. The coefficients on the interaction of guidance and the two performance variables remain positive and statistically significant as expected. 28 The prediction for the interaction of firm age and performance is ambiguous. On one hand, older firms on average have richer information environments, so firm age could proxy for the information environment, which based on the analysis above is expected to strengthen the pay-performance relation. On the other hand, younger firms should have greater investment opportunities, which could lead to an expectation that firm age is negatively related to the payperformance relation. Our results are more consistent with the former explanation.
compensation to performance -both accounting and stock returns -for firms that issue management guidance, our primary empirical proxy for higher disclosure. In a sub-sample of firms that issue guidance, we predict and find that the sensitivity of compensation to performance is increasing in the frequency of management guidance events during the year and in the number of consecutive years that firms have issued management guidance.
The results are robust to tests that use conference calls as an alternative disclosure metric, tests that address the potential endogeneity of management's decision to issue guidance, tests in which compensation is clearly preceded in time by disclosure, and tests that control for the information environment, the asymmetric sensitivity of cash compensation to returns, and variations in investment opportunities.
Our analysis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine how agency problems can be mitigated through greater disclosure. Several empirical studies relate better disclosure to better firm performance and implicitly assume that disclosure leads to better monitoring, which in turn leads to better performance. By focusing on the pay-performance relation, we establish a more direct link between disclosure and monitoring. Second, we contribute to the limited literature on disclosure and corporate governance. These papers focus on incentives or the determinants to disclose, while our paper is about the effects of disclosure.
Third, our study informs the current debate about the role of issuing guidance. Critics have called for an end to management guidance, purporting that such disclosure creates incentives for firms to manage earnings upwards, distort earnings, or act myopically. We are agnostic about the costs of management guidance and do not suggest an equilibrium amount of guidance. We simply point out that improved monitoring of CEOs represents a potential benefit that should be considered in analyses of management guidance. 
APPENDIX Variable Definitions
Variable Definition Beta = equity beta for the fiscal period, calculated in yearly regressions of daily firm returns on daily market-wide (S&P 500) returns.
Book-Market
= ratio of book value to market value of equity for the firm.
CEO Tenure = the difference in years between the current year and the year the CEO became CEO, according to ExecuComp.
Comp
= CEO cash compensation, measured as the sum of salary and bonus.
CompProp
= ratio of CEO stock price-based compensation to total compensation.
Conference Call = indicator variable that equals one if the firms holds a conference call, and zero otherwise. Reg FD = indicator variable that equals one for years 2000 and later, and zero otherwise. R&D = research and development expense scaled by sales, and is set equal to zero for firms with missing research and development expense.
APPENDIX (Continued) Variable Definitions
Ret = annual total raw return to shareholders during the fiscal year adjusted for the value-weighted return on a market portfolio from CRSP.
ROA
= net income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. TradingVolume = total number of shares (000's) traded during the fiscal year.
Var(Ret) = historical annual variance of Ret for the ten years prior to and excluding year t and is calculated only for firms with at least six years of Ret data.
Var(∆ROA)
= historical annual variance of ∆ROA for the ten years prior to and excluding year t and is calculated only for firms with at least six years of ∆ROA data.
Wealth
= value ($M) of shares held by the CEO. ∆ = symbol for change in the variable.
ln( ) = the natural logarithm of a variable.
TABLE 1 Sample Selection
This table summarizes the process used to select our sample (Panel A), and the breakdown of our sample by whether the firm issued management guidance and by year (Panel B).
Panel A: Sample selection procedure
Criteria
Number of Observations
Total CEO-year observations in ExecuComp for which the CEO was in office for all of the year and there was no change in fiscal year 12,973
Less:
Observations with insufficient data to calculate change in total cash compensation 2,486
Observations that could not be matched with CRSP 410
Observations with insufficient data on Compustat 84
Observations where the absolute value of the change in log (cash compensation) exceeds 2 46
Observations where the firm-year is not in the First Call Analyst database 411
Remove firms with top/bottom 1% of ∆ln (Comp) 
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the 9,014 firm-years in our sample (see Table 1 for sample selection procedure). All differences between the management guidance and non-guidance firms are statistically significant at the 5% level for both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Wilcoxon) tests, with the exceptions of Loss, var(∆ROA) and Leverage, which are not significantly different. A firm is classified as a management-guidance firm if the management issues an earnings forecast during the year, and is classified as a non-guidance firm otherwise. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
Guidance Firm Years
Non 
TABLE 3 Correlations
This table reports correlations for the variables in our sample (see Table 1 for sample selection procedure). Spearman (Pearson) correlations are reported in the upper (lower) diagonal. Variables are defined in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Year and industry fixed effects are included for each model but not tabulated. We estimate each model as a panel and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests where there is a prediction for the sign of the coefficient and based on two-tailed tests otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel B, column (2) presents the results of estimating equation (4) for a matched sample of firms. Disclosing firms are matched with non-disclosing firms based on year, industry membership, and size. The sample excludes disclosing firms that fail to match to a non-disclosing firm and vice versa. For Panel B, year and industry fixed effects are included where indicated for each model but not tabulated. We estimate each model as a panel and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests where there is a prediction for the sign of the coefficient and based on two-tailed tests otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
TABLE 7 Re-Estimation of Main Tests Using Conference Call Measures
This table reports the results of replicating the main tests using conference calls as a proxy for disclosure. Column (1) reports the results of estimating equations(4), using conference call measures that are defined analogously to the respective guidance-based disclosure measures. The sample for column (1) test includes all firms, conference-call and non-conference-call holding firm years. Column (2) presents the results of a second-stage model from a Heckman self-selection test. The first-stage model (not tabulated) predicts conference call occurrence and includes the same set of independent variables used in equation (7) to predict management guidance occurrence. The sample includes all firms with sufficient data to calculate the independent variables. Year and industry fixed effects are included for each model but not tabulated. We estimate each model as a panel and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests where there is a prediction for the sign of the coefficient and based on two-tailed tests otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
TABLE 8 Alternative Explanations
This table investigates alternative explanations for our Table 4 result that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger for firms that issue management guidance. The sample includes all firms with available data.
In panel A, we examine the timing of disclosure and compensation decisions. Column (1) shows the results of estimating equation (4) using the change in the logarithm of bonus as the dependent variable. Column (2) shows the results of estimating equation (4) but augmenting it with an interaction of this year's performance with last year's decision to disclose. Column (3) provides the results when we further incorporate next year's disclosure decision into the regression.
In panel B, we include variables that proxy for the information environment. We estimate:
∆ln ( In Panel D, we test for whether our results are robust to an asymmetric sensitivity of compensation to performance. We partition our sample in three ways: below and above the median change in ROA; below and above the median returns; and, negative and positive ROA. We estimate equation (4), our main test, separately for each of the six subsamples.
In Panel E, we include other variables related to firms' investment opportunities that have been shown to affect the pay-performance relation. We estimate: Year and industry fixed effects are included for each model but not tabulated. We estimate each model as a panel and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Coefficient t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance levels are based on one-tailed tests where there is a prediction for the sign of the coefficient and based on two-tailed tests otherwise. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
